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Abstract: We consider a Markovian clearing queueing system, where the customers are accu-
mulated according to a Poisson arrival process and the server removes all present customers at
the completion epochs of exponential service cycles. This system may represent the visits of a
transportation facility with unlimited capacity at a certain station. The system evolves in an
alternating environment that influences the arrival and the service rates. We assume that the
arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural linear reward-
cost structure. We study the balking behavior of the customers and derive the corresponding
Nash equilibrium strategies under various levels of information.
Keywords: Queueing, Stochastic clearing system, Alternating random environment, Balking,
Nash equilibrium strategies
1 Introduction
Queueing systems with batch services are often used to represent the visits of a transportation
facility at a certain station. This allows the quantification of the congestion of the station and
can be used to take control measures (e.g. changing the frequency of the visits), so that the
quality of service is kept within acceptable limits. The capacity of the facility is usually assumed
unlimited. This is justified, because in most applications the capacity of the facility is chosen
large enough, so that the probability that some waiting customers cannot be accommodated is
negligibly small. Moreover, the waiting customers that cannot be served at a visit of the facility
are not in general willing to wait for its next visit and abandon the system. Therefore, it is
realistic to assume that all present customers are removed at the visit points of the facility. Such
systems are referred to as stochastic clearing systems.
Stochastic clearing systems have been studied extensively in the literature (see e.g. Stid-
ham (1974), Serfozo and Stidham (1978), Artalejo and Gomez-Corral (1998) and Yang, Kim
and Chae (2002)). They have been also studied in the framework of stochastic systems subject
to (total) catastrophes or disasters, where catastrophic events are assumed to remove all the
customers/units of the system/population (see e.g. Kyriakidis (1994), Economou and Fakinos
(2003,2008), Stirzaker (2006,2007) and Gani and Swift (2007)). In the majority of such studies
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the interest of the investigators lies in the transient and/or the stationary distribution of the
process of interest. However, optimization issues for this class of systems have also attracted
the interest in the literature (see e.g. Kyriakidis (1999a,b), Economou (2003), Kyriakidis and
Dimitrakos (2005)).
During the last decades, there is an emerging tendency to study queueing systems from an
economic viewpoint. In the context of stochastic clearing systems, the optimization questions
that have been considered so far concern the central planning of the systems. In these studies,
the objective is the determination of optimal policies for the server, about when he should re-
move the customers from the system (see e.g. Stidham (1977), Kim and Seila (1993), Economou
(2003), Kyriakidis and Dimitrakos (2005)). However, to the best of our knowledge, there are
no economic studies that concern the behavior of the customers when they are free to make
decisions to maximize their own benefit. Such considerations lead to a game theoretic economic
analysis of their behavior in the system.
In general, the economic analysis of customer behavior in a queueing system is based on
some reward-cost structure which is imposed on the system and reflects the customers’ desire
for service and their unwillingness to wait. Customers are allowed to make decisions about their
actions in the system, for example they may decide whether to join or balk, to wait or abandon,
to retry or not etc. The customers want to maximize their benefit, taking into account that the
other customers have the same objective, and so the situation can be considered as a game among
them. In this type of studies, the main goal is to find individual and social optimal strategies.
The study of queueing systems under a game-theoretic perspective was initiated by Naor (1969)
who studied the M/M/1 model with a linear reward-cost structure. Naor (1969) assumed that
an arriving customer observes the number of customers and then makes his decision whether to
join or balk (observable case). His study was complemented by Edelson and Hildebrand (1975)
who considered the same queueing system but assumed that the customers make their decisions
without being informed about the state of the system. Since then, there is a growing number of
papers that deal with the economic analysis of the balking behavior of customers in variants of
the M/M/1 queue, see e.g. Hassin and Haviv (1997) (M/M/1 queue with priorities), Burnetas
and Economou (2007) (M/M/1 queue with setup times), Guo and Zipkin (2007) (M/M/1 queue
with various levels of information and non-linear reward-cost structure), Hassin (2007) (M/M/1
queue with various levels of information and uncertainty in the system parameters), Economou
and Kanta (2008a,b) (M/M/1 queue with compartmented waiting space, M/M/1 queue with
unreliable server), Sun, Guo and Tian (2010) (M/M/1 queue with setup/closedown times) and
Zhang and Wang (2010) (M/M/1 queue with delayed repairs). The monographs of Hassin and
Haviv (2003) and Stidham (2009) summarize the main approaches and several results in the
broader area of the economic analysis of queueing systems.
The aim of the present paper is to study the equilibrium behavior of the customers regard-
ing balking in the framework of a Markovian clearing queueing model. The balking behavior
of customers in stochastic clearing systems that model transportation stations is important and
should be taken into account if one wants to obtain a reliable representation of what is going
on in these systems. However, such systems usually evolve in random environment, i.e. there is
some external process that influences the arrival and the service rates. In the present study we
will concentrate on a clearing system evolving in an alternating random environment (modeled
by a 2-state continuous-time Markov chain). We will determine equilibrium balking strategies
for the customers under various levels of information. In particular, we will consider several
2
information cases, as an arriving customer may observe or not the number of customers in the
system and/or the state of the environment, before making his decision about whether to join
or balk.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the stochastic dynamics of the
model, the reward-cost structure and the decision framework (information cases). In Section 3
we consider those cases, where the strategies of the other customers do not influence the ex-
pected net benefit of a tagged customer. These are the unobservable cases, where the tagged
customer does not observe the number of customers in the system before making his decision
and the fully observable case, where he observes both the number of customers in the system
and the state of the environment. In all these cases, we show that the expected net benefit of
a tagged customer depends only on his strategy and not on the strategies followed by the other
customers, a fact that implies the existence of dominant strategies. This is a special feature of
the system that is related to the nature of the stochastic clearing mechanism. In Sections 4 and
5 we consider the almost observable case, where the customers get informed upon arrival about
the number of waiting customers in the station but not about the state of the environment. In
this case, the waiting customers do not imply any additional cost on the individual, but their
presence provides a signal about the clearing rate. Depending on the parameters of the model, a
large number of waiting customers may increase or decrease the conditional probability that the
clearing rate is the slow one. In Section 4, we present some preliminary results. More concretely,
we first compute the stationary distributions of the system, when the customers follow either
a threshold or a reverse-threshold strategy. Then we compute the net benefit of an arriving
customer who decides to join, given that he observes n customers and that the others follow
a threshold or a reverse-threshold strategy. In Section 5, we conclude our study and we char-
acterize all equilibrium strategies within the class of threshold and reverse-threshold strategies.
The main contribution of the paper is an algorithm that computes efficiently all these equilib-
rium strategies. In Section 6, we summarize our findings and discuss the Follow-The-Crowd and
Avoid-The-Crowd notions for this model as well as the problem of social optimization.
2 The model
We consider a transportation station with infinite waiting space that operates in an alternating
environment. The environment is specified by a 2-state continuous-time Markov chain {E(t)},
with state space SE = {1, 2} and transition rates qee′ , for e 6= e′. Whenever the environment is
at state e, customers arrive according to a Poisson process at rate λe, whereas a transportation
facility visits the station according to a Poisson process at rate µe. The two Poisson processes
are assumed independent. At the visit epochs of the transportation facility all customers are
served instantaneously and removed from the station. Therefore, we have a stochastic clearing
system in an alternating random environment.
We represent the state of the station at time t by a pair (N(t), E(t)), where N(t) records
the number of customers at the station and E(t) denotes the environmental state. The stochas-
tic process {(N(t), E(t)) : t ≥ 0} is a continuous-time Markov chain with state space SN,E =
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{(n, e) : n ≥ 0, e = 1, 2} and its non-zero transition rates are given by
q(n,e)(n+1,e) = λe, n ≥ 0, e = 1, 2, (2.1)
q(n,e)(0,e) = µe, n ≥ 1, e = 1, 2, (2.2)
q(n,1)(n,2) = q12, n ≥ 0, (2.3)
q(n,2)(n,1) = q21, n ≥ 0. (2.4)
We define ρe =
λe
µe
, e = 1, 2. The value of ρe can be thought of as a measure of congestion of the
system under the environmental state e, as it expresses the mean number of customers accu-
mulated between two successive visits of the transportation facility (given that the environment
remains continuously in state e).
We are interested in the behavior of customers, when they have the option to decide whether
to join or balk. We assume that a customer receives a reward of R utility units for completing
service. Moreover, a customer accumulates costs at a rate of C utility units per time unit that
he remains in the system. We also assume that customers are risk neutral and wish to maximize
their net benefit. Finally, their decisions are assumed irrevocable, in the sense that neither
reneging of entering customers nor retrials of balking customers are allowed.
Since all customers are assumed indistinguishable, we can consider the situation as a sym-
metric game among them. Denote the common set of strategies (set of available actions) and
the utility (payoff) function by S and U respectively. More concretely, let U (stagged, sothers) be
the payoff of a tagged customer who follows strategy stagged, when all other customers follow
sothers. A strategy s1 is said to dominate strategy s2 if U (s1, s) ≥ U (s2, s), for every s ∈ S. A
strategy s∗ is said to be dominant if it dominates all other strategies in S. A strategy s˜ is said
to be a best response against a strategy sothers, if U (s˜, sothers) ≥ U (stagged, sothers), for every
stagged ∈ S. Finally, a strategy se is said to be a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium, if and only
if it is a best response against itself, i.e. U (se, se) ≥ U (s, se), for every s ∈ S. The intuitive
interpretation of a Nash equilibrium is that it is a stable point of the game, in the sense that if
all customers agree to follow it, then no one can benefit by deviating from it. We remark that
the notion of a dominant strategy is stronger than the notion of an equilibrium. In fact, every
dominant strategy is an equilibrium, but the converse is not true. Moreover, while equilibrium
strategies exist in most situations, dominant strategies rarely do.
In the next sections we obtain customer equilibrium strategies for joining/balking. We
distinguish four cases depending on the information available to the customers at their arrival
instants, before the decision is made:
• Fully unobservable case: Customers do not observe N(t) nor E(t).
• Almost unobservable case: Customers do not observe N(t), but observe E(t).
• Fully observable case: Customers observe both N(t) and E(t).
• Almost observable case: Customers observe N(t), but do not observe E(t).
From a methodological point of view, the first three cases are similar and they lead to
dominant strategies, so we study all of them in Section 3. The almost observable case which is
the most interesting and methodologically demanding is treated in Sections 4 and 5.
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3 The unobservable and the fully observable cases: Dominant
strategies
Let Se denote the time till the next arrival of the transportation facility, given that the envi-
ronment is at state e. A moment of reflection shows that Se is independent of the number of
customers in the system, because of the mechanism of the total removals of customers at the
visits of the facility and the memoryless property of the exponential distribution. By employing
a first-step argument, conditioning on the next transition of the Markov chain {(N(t), E(t))}
that is either a visit of the facility or a change in the environment, we obtain the equations
E[S1] =
1
µ1 + q12
+
µ1
µ1 + q12
· 0 + q12
µ1 + q12
· E[S2], (3.1)
E[S2] =
1
µ2 + q21
+
µ2
µ2 + q21
· 0 + q21
µ2 + q21
· E[S1]. (3.2)
Solving (3.1)-(3.2) yields
E[S1] =
µ2 + q21 + q12
µ1µ2 + µ1q21 + µ2q12
, (3.3)
E[S2] =
µ1 + q21 + q12
µ1µ2 + µ1q21 + µ2q12
. (3.4)
3.1 The fully unobservable case
We can now proceed and determine the equilibrium strategies of the customers in the fully
unobservable case. A general balking strategy in the fully unobservable case is specified by a
single joining probability q. The case q = 0 corresponds to the pure strategy ‘to balk’ whereas
the case q = 1 corresponds to the pure strategy ‘to join’. Any value of q ∈ (0, 1) corresponds to
a mixed (randomized) strategy ‘to join with probability q or balk with probability 1 − q’. We
have the following Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1 In the fully unobservable model of the stochastic clearing system in alternating
environment, there always exists a dominant strategy. The dominant strategies depend on the
relative value of the ratio R
C
with respect to the critical value
Vfu =
λ1q21µ2 + λ2q12µ1
(λ1q21 + λ2q12)(µ1µ2 + µ1q21 + µ2q12)
+
q21 + q12
µ1µ2 + µ1q21 + µ2q12
. (3.5)
We have three cases that are summarized in Table 1.
Value of R
C
R
C
< Vfu
R
C
= Vfu
R
C
> Vfu
Dominant strategy(ies) 0 q ∈ [0, 1] 1
Table 1: Dominant strategies in the fully unobservable case
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Proof. Suppose that the customers follow a certain strategy and consider a tagged customer
upon arrival. The probability that he finds the environment at state e is
pE−arrival(e) =
λepE(e)
(λ1pE(1) + λ2pE(2))
, (3.6)
where (pE(e), e = 1, 2) is the stationary distribution of the environment which is given by
pE(1) =
q21
q21 + q12
(3.7)
pE(2) =
q12
q21 + q12
. (3.8)
Therefore, the expected net benefit of the tagged customer if he decides to join is given by
Sfu =
2∑
e=1
pE−arrival(e)(R − CE[Se]), (3.9)
where E[Se] are given by (3.3)-(3.4). Plugging (3.7)-(3.8) in (3.6) and substituting in (3.9) yields
Sfu = R− C λ1q21E[S1] + λ2q12E[S2]
λ1q21 + λ2q12
= R− C
(
λ1q21µ2 + λ2q12µ1
(λ1q21 + λ2q12)(µ1µ2 + µ1q21 + µ2q12)
+
q21 + q12
µ1µ2 + µ1q21 + µ2q12
)
.(3.10)
The tagged customer prefers to join if Sfu > 0, prefers to balk if Sfu < 0 and he is indifferent
between joining and balking if Sfu = 0 . Solving with respect to
R
C
, we obtain the three cases
of Table 1. 
3.2 The almost unobservable case
We can now proceed and determine the equilibrium strategies of the customers in the almost
unobservable case. A general balking strategy in the almost unobservable case is specified by
an ordered pair of joining probabilities (q1, q2), where qe is the joining probability of a customer
if the environmental state upon arrival is e, e = 1, 2. We have the following Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2 In the almost unobservable model of the stochastic clearing system in alternating
environment, there always exists a dominant strategy. The dominant strategies depend on the
relative value of the ratio R
C
with respect to the critical values
V minau =
min(µ1, µ2) + q21 + q12
µ1µ2 + µ1q21 + µ2q12
, V maxau =
max(µ1, µ2) + q21 + q12
µ1µ2 + µ1q21 + µ2q12
. (3.11)
If µ1 6= µ2, then V minau < V maxau and we have five cases that are summarized in Table 2.
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Value of R
C
R
C
< V minau
R
C
= V minau V
min
au <
R
C
< V maxau
R
C
= V maxau
R
C
> V maxau
Dominant
strategy(ies), (0, 0) (0, q2), (0, 1) (q1, 1), (1, 1)
when µ1 < µ2 q2 ∈ [0, 1] q1 ∈ [0, 1]
Dominant
strategy(ies), (0, 0) (q1, 0), (1, 0) (1, q2), (1, 1)
when µ1 > µ2 q1 ∈ [0, 1] q2 ∈ [0, 1]
Table 2: Dominant strategies in the almost unobservable case, when µ1 6= µ2
If µ1 = µ2, then V
min
au = V
max
au . Let Vau denote the common value of V
min
au and V
max
au . We
have three cases that are summarized in Table 3.
Value of R
C
R
C
< Vau
R
C
= Vau
R
C
> Vau
Dominant strategy(ies), (0, 0) (q1, q2), (1, 1)
when µ1 = µ2 q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1]
Table 3: Dominant strategies in the almost unobservable case, when µ1 = µ2
Proof. Consider a tagged customer that observes the state of the environment upon arrival. If
he decides to join given that he finds the environment at state e, then his expected net benefit
will be
Sau(e) = R− CE[Se], (3.12)
where E[Se] are given by (3.3)-(3.4). The customer prefers to join if Sau(e) > 0, which is written
equivalently as R
C
> E[Se]. Similarly, we have that he prefers to balk if
R
C
< E[Se] and he is
indifferent between joining and balking if R
C
= E[Se]. By considering the various possible cases
with regard to the order of the three quantities R
C
, E[S1] and E[S2], we obtain the corresponding
cases in the statement of the Theorem 3.2. Note that the strategies prescribed in the Theorem
3.2 are dominant, since they do not depend on what the other customers do, i.e. they are best
responses against any strategy of the others. 
3.3 The fully observable case
Regarding the fully observable case, where the arriving customers observe both the number of
waiting customers and the state of the environment, the situation is identical to the almost
unobservable case. This happens because the mean sojourn time of an arriving customer, given
that he finds n customers in the system and the environment at state e does not depend on n.
Therefore, if the environmental state e is observed upon arrival, then the information about the
number of customers n is superfluous and is discarded by the customers. We conclude that the
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dominant balking strategies are the ones described in Theorem 3.2.
4 The almost observable case: Preliminaries
In this section, we consider the almost observable case. In this case, the customers, upon ar-
rival and before making their decisions about whether to join or balk, observe the number of
customers in the system but not the state of the environment. Thus a general balking strategy
in this case is specified by a vector of joining probabilities (θ0, θ1, θ2, . . .), where θi is the joining
probability of a customer that sees i customers in the system upon arrival (excluding himself).
Suppose that a tagged customer observes n customers in the system upon arrival. Although
his mean sojourn time does not depend on n, the information about n influences the probabilities
that the environment is found at state 1 or 2. We expect intuitively that there are two cases:
Either the ‘slow service’ environmental state e with µe = min(µ1, µ2) coincides to the ‘more
congested’ environmental state e′ with ρe′ = max(ρ1, ρ2) or it coincides to the ‘less congested’
environmental state e′′ with ρe′′ = min(ρ1, ρ2). In the former case, the greater the number n
of the customers found by the tagged customer, the more probable is that the environment is
found at the ‘slow service’ environmental state. Therefore, the tagged customer becomes less
willing to join the system as n increases. Thus, we expect that the tagged customer will benefit
from joining the system, if the number of customers n is below a certain threshold, i.e. he will
adopt a threshold strategy. On the contrary, in the latter case, the situation is reversed. Then,
the greater the number n of the customers found by a tagged customer, the more probable is
that the environment is found at the ‘fast service’ environmental state. Therefore, we expect
that the tagged customer will benefit from joining the system, if the number of customers n
exceeds a certain threshold, i.e. he will adopt a so called reverse-threshold strategy. Following
this reasoning, we will limit our search for equilibrium strategies within the class of threshold
and reverse-threshold strategies. As we will see, this family is rich enough to ensure the existence
of an equilibrium strategy for any values of the underlying parameters of the model.
Definition 4.1 A balking strategy (θ0, θ1, θ2, . . .), where θi is the joining probability of a cus-
tomer that sees i customers in the system upon arrival (excluding himself) is said to be a mixed
threshold strategy, if there exist n0 ∈ {0, 1, . . .} and θ ∈ [0, 1] such that θi = 1, for i < n0, θn0 = θ
and θi = 0, for i > n0. Such a strategy will be referred to as the (n0, θ)-mixed threshold strategy
(symbolically the ⌈n0, θ⌉ strategy) and it prescribes to join if you see less than n0 customers,
to join with probability θ if you see exactly n0 customers and to balk if you see more than n0
customers.
An (n0, 0)-mixed threshold strategy which prescribes to join if you see less than n0 customers
and to balk otherwise will be referred to as the n0-pure threshold strategy (symbolically the ⌈n0⌉
strategy).
A balking strategy (θ0, θ1, θ2, . . .) is said to be a mixed reverse-threshold strategy, if there exist
n0 ∈ {0, 1, . . .} and θ ∈ [0, 1] such that θi = 0, for i < n0, θn0 = θ and θi = 1, for i > n0. Such a
strategy will be referred to as the (n0, θ)-mixed reverse-threshold strategy (symbolically the ⌊n0, θ⌋
strategy) and it prescribes to balk if you see less than n0 customers, to join with probability θ if
you see exactly n0 customers and to join if you see more that n0 customers.
An (n0, 1)-mixed reverse-threshold strategy which prescribes to join if you see at least n0
customers and to balk otherwise will be referred to as the n0-pure reverse-threshold strategy
(symbolically the ⌊n0⌋ strategy).
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The strategy which prescribes to join in any case is considered to be both a threshold and
a reverse-threshold strategy (symbolically the ⌈∞⌉ or ⌊0⌋ strategy). The same is true for the
strategy which prescribes to balk in any case (symbolically the ⌈0⌉ or ⌊∞⌋ strategy).
4.1 Stationary distributions
In this subsection, we determine the stationary distributions of the system, when the customers
follow any given strategy from the ones that have been described in Definition 4.1. We will first
determine the stationary distribution of the original system when all customers join. The result
is reported in the following Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.1 Consider the stochastic clearing system in alternating environment, where all
customers join. The stationary distribution (p(n, e)) is given by the formulas
p(n, 1) = A1
(
1
1− z1
)n
+B1
(
1
1− z2
)n
, n ≥ 0, (4.1)
p(n, 2) = A2
(
1
1− z1
)n
+B2
(
1
1− z2
)n
, n ≥ 0, (4.2)
where
A1 =
(µ1λ2z1 + µ1µ2 + µ2q12 + µ1q21)pE(1)√
∆(1− z1)
, (4.3)
B1 = −(µ1λ2z2 + µ1µ2 + µ2q12 + µ1q21)pE(1)√
∆(1− z2)
, (4.4)
A2 =
(µ2λ1z1 + µ1µ2 + µ2q12 + µ1q21)pE(2)√
∆(1− z1)
, (4.5)
B2 = −(µ2λ1z2 + µ1µ2 + µ2q12 + µ1q21)pE(2)√
∆(1− z2)
, (4.6)
∆ = [λ2(µ1 + q12)− λ1(µ2 + q21)]2 + 4λ1λ2q12q21, (4.7)
z1,2 =
−λ1(µ2 + q21)− λ2(µ1 + q12)±
√
∆
2λ1λ2
(4.8)
and pE(1), pE(2) are the stationary probabilities of {E(t)} given from (3.7)-(3.8).
Proof. For the stationary analysis, note that the state of the system is described by a continuous-
time Markov chain with state space SN,E = {(n, e) : n ≥ 0, e = 1, 2} with its non-zero transi-
tion rates given by (2.1)-(2.4). The corresponding stationary distribution (p(n, e) : (n, e) ∈ SN,E)
is obtained as the unique positive normalized solution of the following system of balance equa-
tions:
(λ1 + µ1 + q12)p(0, 1) = q21p(0, 2) +
∞∑
n=0
µ1p(n, 1), (4.9)
(λ1 + µ1 + q12)p(n, 1) = q21p(n, 2) + λ1p(n− 1, 1), n ≥ 1, (4.10)
(λ2 + µ2 + q21)p(0, 2) = q12p(0, 1) +
∞∑
n=0
µ2p(n, 2), (4.11)
(λ2 + µ2 + q21)p(n, 2) = q12p(n, 1) + λ2p(n− 1, 2), n ≥ 1, (4.12)
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where we have included in (4.9), (4.11) the pseudo-transitions from (0, e) to (0, e), e = 1, 2,
with rate µe, that correspond to visits of the facility at an empty system. Note also that the
underlying Markov chain is always positive recurrent as the stochastic clearing mechanism en-
sures that starting from the state (0, 1), the process will visit it again with probability 1 and
the corresponding mean time is finite.
For determining the stationary probabilities, we may follow the standard probability gener-
ating function approach. Thus, we define the partial stationary probability generating functions
of the system as
Ge(z) =
∞∑
n=0
p(n, e)zn, |z| ≤ 1, e = 1, 2. (4.13)
and we observe that G1(1) = pE(1), G2(1) = pE(2) with pE(1), pE(2) given from (3.7)-(3.8).
Summing equation (4.9) and equations (4.10) multiplied by zn, n ≥ 1, yields after some straight-
forward algebra a linear equation in G1(z) and G2(z). Similarly, equations (4.11) and (4.12),
n ≥ 1, yield another linear equation in G1(z) and G2(z). Solving the system of these equations
we obtain G1(z) and G2(z) as rational functions of z with known coefficients expressed in terms
of the parameters of the model. Using partial fraction expansion and then expanding the simple
fractions in powers of z yields (4.1) and (4.2). Indeed, by direct substitution, we can easily check
that p(n, 1) and p(n, 2) given by (4.1) and (4.2) satisfy (4.10). By a simple summation, we can
also check that p(n, 1) and p(n, 2) given by (4.1) and (4.2) satisfy (4.9). The validity of (4.12)
and (4.11) is checked similarly. 
We will now deduce the stationary distribution of the system when the customers follow a
mixed threshold strategy. We have the following Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2 Consider the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in
alternating environment, where the customers join the system according to the (n0, θ)-mixed
threshold strategy. The corresponding stationary distribution (pao(n, e; ⌈n0, θ⌉)) is given by the
formulas
pao(n, e; ⌈n0, θ⌉) = p(n, e), 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1, e = 1, 2, (4.14)
pao(n0, e; ⌈n0, θ⌉) =
∞∑
n=n0
(1− θ)n−n0p(n, e), e = 1, 2, (4.15)
pao(n0 + 1, e; ⌈n0, θ⌉) =
∞∑
n=n0+1
[1− (1− θ)n−n0]p(n, e), e = 1, 2, (4.16)
pao(n, e; ⌈n0, θ⌉) = 0, n ≥ n0 + 2, e = 1, 2, (4.17)
where p(n, e) are given by (4.1)-(4.2).
Proof. We assume that the customers follow the (n0, θ)-mixed threshold strategy. Then the
evolution of the system can be described by a Markov chain which is absorbed with probability 1
in the positive recurrent closed class of states SN,Eao (⌈n0, θ⌉) = {(n, e) : 0 ≤ n ≤ n0+1, e = 1, 2}.
For the sake of brevity, we suppress the notation regarding ⌈n0, θ⌉ in the rest of the proof . Thus,
we will refer to the corresponding stationary probabilities pao(n, e; ⌈n0, θ⌉) by pao(n, e).
Since the Markov chain is finally absorbed in SN,Eao (⌈n0, θ⌉), we obtain immediately (4.17).
The vector of the stationary probabilities (pao(n, e) : (n, e) ∈ SN,Eao (⌈n0, θ⌉)) is obtained as the
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unique positive normalized solution of the system of balance equations
(λ1 + µ1 + q12)pao(0, 1) = q21pao(0, 2) +
n0+1∑
n=0
µ1pao(n, 1), (4.18)
(λ1 + µ1 + q12)pao(n, 1) = q21pao(n, 2) + λ1pao(n− 1, 1), 1 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1, (4.19)
(λ1θ + µ1 + q12)pao(n0, 1) = q21pao(n0, 2) + λ1pao(n0 − 1, 1), (4.20)
(µ1 + q12)pao(n0 + 1, 1) = q21pao(n0 + 1, 2) + λ1θpao(n0, 1), (4.21)
(λ2 + µ2 + q21)pao(0, 2) = q12pao(0, 1) +
n0+1∑
n=0
µ2pao(n, 2), (4.22)
(λ2 + µ2 + q21)pao(n, 2) = q12pao(n, 1) + λ2pao(n− 1, 2), 1 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1, (4.23)
(λ2θ + µ2 + q21)pao(n0, 2) = q12pao(n0, 1) + λ2pao(n0 − 1, 2), (4.24)
(µ2 + q21)pao(n0 + 1, 2) = q12pao(n0 + 1, 1) + λ2θpao(n0, 2), (4.25)
where we have included in (4.18) and (4.22) the pseudo-transitions from (0, e) to (0, e), e = 1, 2,
with rate µe, that correspond to visits of the facility at an empty system.
For deducing the formulas (4.14)-(4.17) for the stationary probabilities, we may again follow
the standard probability generating function approach, as it was briefly described in the proof
of Proposition 4.1. However, given the formulas (4.14)-(4.17), it is easy to check by direct sub-
stitution that the stationary probabilities satisfy the equations (4.18)-(4.25) (using also simple
summations for (4.18) and (4.22)). 
We can now readily conclude the following Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2.
Corollary 4.1 Consider the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in al-
ternating environment, where the customers join the system according to the n0-pure threshold
strategy. The corresponding stationary distribution (pao(n, e; ⌈n0⌉)) is given by the formulas
pao(n, e; ⌈n0⌉) = p(n, e), 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1, e = 1, 2, (4.26)
pao(n0, e; ⌈n0⌉) =
∞∑
n=n0
p(n, e), e = 1, 2, (4.27)
pao(n, e; ⌈n0⌉) = 0, n ≥ n0 + 1, e = 1, 2, (4.28)
where p(n, e) are given by (4.1)-(4.2).
Corollary 4.2 Consider the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in alter-
nating environment, where the customers always balk. The corresponding stationary distribution
(pao(n, e; ⌈0⌉)) is given by the formulas
pao(0, e; ⌈0⌉) = pE(e), e = 1, 2, (4.29)
pao(n, e; ⌈0⌉) = 0, n ≥ 1, e = 1, 2, (4.30)
where pE(e), e = 1, 2 are given by (3.7)-(3.8).
We will now deduce the stationary distribution of the system when the customers follow an
(n0, θ)-mixed reverse-threshold strategy.
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Remark 4.1 Under an (n0, θ)-mixed reverse-threshold strategy with n0 ≥ 1, we have that the
customers balk when they arrive at an empty system. Thus we have the stationary distribution
of Corollary 4.2.
It is left to show what happens when the customers follow a (0, θ)-mixed reverse-threshold
strategy.
Proposition 4.3 Consider the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in al-
ternating environment, where the customers join the system according to a (0, θ)-mixed reverse-
threshold strategy. For θ = 0, the stationary distribution (pao(n, e; ⌊0, 0⌋)) is given by the for-
mulas
pao(0, e; ⌊0, 0⌋) = pE(e), e = 1, 2, (4.31)
pao(n, e; ⌊0, 0⌋) = 0, n ≥ 1, e = 1, 2, (4.32)
where pE(e), e = 1, 2 are given by (3.7)-(3.8).
For θ ∈ (0, 1), the stationary distribution (pao(n, e; ⌊0, θ⌋)) is given by the formulas
pao(0, e; ⌊0, θ⌋) =
∞∑
n=0
(1− θ)np(n, e), e = 1, 2, (4.33)
pao(n, e; ⌊0, θ⌋) = θ
∞∑
i=n
(1− θ)i−np(i, e), n ≥ 1, e = 1, 2, (4.34)
where p(n, e) are given by (4.1)-(4.2).
For θ = 1, the stationary distribution (pao(n, e; ⌊0, 1⌋)) is given by the formula
pao(n, e; ⌊0, 1⌋) = p(n, e), n ≥ 0, e = 1, 2, (4.35)
where p(n, e) are given by (4.1)-(4.2).
The proof of Proposition 4.3 for θ = 0 is immediate, as in this case the customers balk
whenever they arrive at an empty system. Therefore under such a strategy the corresponding
continuous-time Markov chain is absorbed with probability 1 into the subset {(0, 1), (0, 2)} of the
state space and the stationary distribution is the one given by (4.29) and (4.30) as in Corollary
4.2. In case θ = 1, the customers always join so we apply Proposition 4.1. Thus, the only
interesting case is for θ ∈ (0, 1). Then, the proof of Proposition 4.3 follows a similar line of
argument as the proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, it is
omitted.
4.2 Expected net benefit functions
Based on the results of subsection 4.1, we can now compute the expected net benefit of a tagged
customer if he decides to join the system after observing n customers upon arrival. Of course,
his expected net benefit depends on the strategy followed by the other customers. Thus, we
have various cases, according to whether the customers follow a threshold or a reverse-threshold
strategy. We have the following Propositions 4.4–4.6 and the Corollary 4.3.
Proposition 4.4 Consider the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in
alternating environment, where all customers join the system. Then, the expected net benefit
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Sao(n; ⌈∞⌉) ≡ Sao(n; ⌊0⌋) of an arriving customer, if he decides to join, given that he finds n
customers in the system, is given by
Sao(n; ⌈∞⌉) ≡ Sao(n; ⌊0⌋) = R− C
A
(
1
1−z1
)n
+B
(
1
1−z2
)n
D
(
1
1−z1
)n
+ E
(
1
1−z2
)n , n ≥ 0, (4.36)
where
A = λ1A1E[S1] + λ2A2E[S2], (4.37)
B = λ1B1E[S1] + λ2B2E[S2], (4.38)
D = λ1A1 + λ2A2, (4.39)
E = λ1B1 + λ2B2 (4.40)
and E[S1], E[S2], A1, B1, A2, B2, z1, z2 are given by (3.3)-(3.4), (4.3)-(4.6) and (4.8).
Proof. The mean sojourn time of an arriving customer, if he decides to join, given that he
finds n customers in the system is given by
p−ao(1|n; ⌈∞⌉)E[S1] + p−ao(2|n; ⌈∞⌉)E[S2], (4.41)
where p−ao(e|n; ⌈∞⌉), e = 1, 2, is the probability that an arriving customer finds the environment
at state e, given that he observes n customers in the system and that the ⌈∞⌉-strategy is followed
by the other customers. The embedded (Palm) probabilities p−ao(e|n; ⌈∞⌉) are given by
p−ao(e|n; ⌈∞⌉) =
λep(n, e)
λ1p(n, 1) + λ2p(n, 2)
, e = 1, 2, (4.42)
where p(n, e) are given by (4.1)-(4.2). Thus, the expected benefit of the tagged arriving customer,
if he decides to join, is equal to
Sao(n; ⌈∞⌉) ≡ Sao(n; ⌊0⌋) = R− C[p−ao(1|n; ⌈∞⌉)E[S1] + p−ao(2|n; ⌈∞⌉)E[S2]]. (4.43)
Plugging the formulas (4.1)-(4.2) into (4.42) and subsequently into (4.43) yields (4.36). 
Proposition 4.5 Consider the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in
alternating environment, where the customers join the system according to the (n0, θ)-mixed
threshold strategy. Then, the expected net benefit Sao(n; ⌈n0, θ⌉) of an arriving customer, if he
decides to join, given that he finds n customers in the system, is given by
Sao(n; ⌈n0, θ⌉) = R− C
A
(
1
1−z1
)n
+B
(
1
1−z2
)n
D
(
1
1−z1
)n
+ E
(
1
1−z2
)n , 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1, (4.44)
Sao(n0; ⌈n0, θ⌉) = R− C
∑
∞
i=n0
(1− θ)i−n0
[
A
(
1
1−z1
)i
+B
(
1
1−z2
)i]
∑
∞
i=n0
(1− θ)i−n0
[
D
(
1
1−z1
)i
+ E
(
1
1−z2
)i] , (4.45)
Sao(n0 + 1; ⌈n0, θ⌉) = R− C
∑
∞
i=n0+1
[1− (1− θ)i−n0 ]
[
A
(
1
1−z1
)i
+B
(
1
1−z2
)i]
∑
∞
i=n0+1
[1− (1− θ)i−n0 ]
[
D
(
1
1−z1
)i
+ E
(
1
1−z2
)i] ,(4.46)
where A, B, D, E, z1, z2 are given by (4.37)-(4.40) and (4.8).
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Proof. Assume that the customers join the system according to the (n0, θ)-mixed threshold
strategy. Then, the mean sojourn time of a tagged arriving customer, if he decides to join, given
that he finds n customers in the system is given by
p−ao(1|n; ⌈n0, θ⌉)E[S1] + p−ao(2|n; ⌈n0, θ⌉)E[S2], (4.47)
where p−ao(e|n; ⌈n0, θ⌉), e = 1, 2, is the probability that an arriving customer finds the environ-
ment at state e, given that there are n customers in the system and that the ⌈n0, θ⌉-strategy is
followed. The embedded (Palm) probabilities are given by
p−ao(e|n; ⌈n0, θ⌉) =
λepao(n, e; ⌈n0, θ⌉)
λ1pao(n, 1; ⌈n0, θ⌉) + λ2pao(n, 2; ⌈n0, θ⌉) , e = 1, 2, (4.48)
where pao(n, e; ⌈n0, θ⌉) are given by (4.14)-(4.16). Thus, the expected benefit of the tagged
customer, if he decides to join, is equal to
Sao(n; ⌈n0, θ⌉) = R− C[p−ao(1|n; ⌈n0, θ⌉)E[S1] + p−ao(2|n; ⌈n0, θ⌉)E[S2]]. (4.49)
Using the various forms of pao(n, e; ⌈n0, θ⌉) in (4.14)-(4.16) yields (4.44)-(4.46). 
In the case of the n0-pure threshold strategy, we obtain the following Corollary 4.3.
Corollary 4.3 Consider the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in al-
ternating environment, where the customers join the system according to the n0-pure threshold
strategy. Then, the expected net benefit Sao(n; ⌈n0⌉) of an arriving customer, if he decides to
join, given that he finds n customers in the system, is given by
Sao(n; ⌈n0⌉) = R−C
A
(
1
1−z1
)n
+B
(
1
1−z2
)n
D
(
1
1−z1
)n
+ E
(
1
1−z2
)n , 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1, (4.50)
Sao(n0; ⌈n0⌉) = R−C
∑
∞
i=n0
[
A
(
1
1−z1
)i
+B
(
1
1−z2
)i]
∑
∞
i=n0
[
D
(
1
1−z1
)i
+ E
(
1
1−z2
)i] , (4.51)
where A, B, D, E, z1, z2 are given by (4.37)-(4.40) and (4.8).
Remark 4.2 Applying Corollary 4.3 for n0 = 0 yields the expected net benefit Sao(0; ⌈0⌉) ≡
Sao(0; ⌊∞⌋) of an arriving customer, if he decides to join, when the others follow the ‘always
balk’ strategy.
When the customers follow a (0, θ)-mixed reverse-threshold strategy, with θ ∈ (0, 1), we can
use the same line of argument with Propositions 4.4 and 4.5, using the stationary distribution
given by (4.33)-(4.34). Then we have the following Proposition 4.6.
Proposition 4.6 Consider the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in al-
ternating environment, where the customers join the system according to the (0, θ)-mixed reverse-
threshold strategy for some θ ∈ (0, 1). Then, the expected net benefit Sao(n; ⌊0, θ⌋) of an arriving
costumer, if he decides to join, given that he finds n customers in the system, is given by
Sao(n; ⌊0, θ⌋) = R− C
∑
∞
i=n(1− θ)i−n
[
A
(
1
1−z1
)i
+B
(
1
1−z2
)i]
∑
∞
i=n(1− θ)i−n
[
D
(
1
1−z1
)i
+ E
(
1
1−z2
)i] , n ≥ 0, (4.52)
where A, B, D, E, z1, z2 are given by (4.37)-(4.40) and (4.8).
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To express the various formulas reported in Propositions 4.4–4.6 and in Corollary 4.3 for the
expected net benefit function in a compact, unified way, we introduce the functions
F (n, θ) =
∞∑
i=n
(1− θ)i−n
[
(RD − CA)
(
1
1− z1
)i
+ (RE − CB)
(
1
1− z2
)i]
, (4.53)
G(n, θ) =
∞∑
i=n
(1− θ)i−n
[
D
(
1
1− z1
)i
+ E
(
1
1− z2
)i]
, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1], (4.54)
HU (n) =
F (n, 1)
G(n, 1)
, HL(n) =
F (n, 0)
G(n, 0)
, n ≥ 0. (4.55)
Then we have
Sao(n; ⌈∞⌉) ≡ Sao(n; ⌊0⌋) = F (n, 1)
G(n, 1)
= HU (n), n ≥ 0, (4.56)
Sao(n; ⌈n0, θ⌉) = F (n, 1)
G(n, 1)
= HU (n), 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1, (4.57)
Sao(n0; ⌈n0, θ⌉) = F (n0, θ)
G(n0, θ)
, (4.58)
Sao(n0 + 1; ⌈n0, θ⌉) = F (n0, 0) − F (n0, θ)
G(n0, 0) −G(n0, θ) , (4.59)
Sao(n; ⌈n0⌉) = F (n, 1)
G(n, 1)
= HU (n), 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1, (4.60)
Sao(n0; ⌈n0⌉) = F (n0, 0)
G(n0, 0)
= HL(n0), (4.61)
Sao(0; ⌈0⌉) ≡ Sao(0; ⌊∞⌋) = F (0, 0)
G(0, 0)
= HL(0), (4.62)
Sao(n; ⌊0, θ⌋) = F (n, θ)
G(n, θ)
, n ≥ 0. (4.63)
5 The almost observable case: Equilibrium strategies
As we have already discussed in the beginning of Section 4, it seems plausible that threshold
strategies are adopted by the customers when the ‘fast service’ environmental state coincides
with the ‘less congested’ environmental state, i.e. when (µ1−µ2)(ρ1−ρ2) < 0. On the contrary,
reverse-threshold strategies are plausible when the ‘fast service’ environmental state coincides
with the ‘more congested’ environmental state, i.e. when the opposite inequality holds. This
intuitive finding is associated with the monotonicity of HU (n) which plays a key role in the
subsequent analysis. More specifically, we have the following Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 5.1 We have the following equivalences:
HU (n) is strictly decreasing ⇔ AE −BD > 0⇔ (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) < 0. (5.1)
HU (n) is constant ⇔ AE −BD = 0⇔ µ1 = µ2 or ρ1 = ρ2. (5.2)
HU (n) is strictly increasing ⇔ AE −BD < 0⇔ (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) > 0. (5.3)
The proof of this proposition is omitted, since its first case follows easily by simple algebraic
manipulations that start from the relation HU(n + 1)−HU (n) < 0 and lead to AE − BD > 0
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and (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) < 0, through successive equivalences. The other two cases are treated
similarly. Moreover, the monotonicity of the function F (n,θ)
G(n,θ) with respect to θ depends on the
sign of (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2). Specifically, we have the following Proposition 5.2.
Proposition 5.2 We have the following equivalences:
F (n, θ)
G(n, θ)
is strictly increasing in θ ⇔ AE −BD > 0⇔ (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) < 0. (5.4)
F (n, θ)
G(n, θ)
is constant in θ ⇔ AE −BD = 0⇔ µ1 = µ2 or ρ1 = ρ2. (5.5)
F (n, θ)
G(n, θ)
is strictly decreasing in θ ⇔ AE −BD < 0⇔ (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) > 0. (5.6)
The proof of this proposition is also omitted, since the result is deduced easily after some algebra.
We now state some properties of F (n, θ), G(n, θ) and HU (n), HL(n) that we will use in the
sequel. Their proof is straightforward from their definition and thus it is omitted.
Lemma 5.1 The functions F (n, θ), G(n, θ) satisfy the following properties:
F (n, θ) =
∞∑
i=n
(1− θ)i−nF (i, 1) = F (n, 1) + (1− θ)F (n+ 1, θ), n ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1], (5.7)
G(n, θ) =
∞∑
i=n
(1− θ)i−nG(i, 1) = G(n, 1) + (1− θ)G(n+ 1, θ), n ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1], (5.8)
G(n, θ) > 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1], (5.9)
G(n, θ) is strictly decreasing with respect to θ for any fixed n ≥ 0. (5.10)
Note that properties (5.9) and (5.10) of G(n, θ) assure that all denominators in (4.56)-(4.63)
are positive.
The intuitive discussion at the beginning of Section 4 in combination with Propositions 5.1
and 5.2 suggests that we should methodologically proceed by considering separately three cases,
corresponding to the sign (negative, positive or zero) of (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2).
5.1 Case A: (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) < 0
In Case A, we will prove that an equilibrium threshold strategy always exists. Moreover, we
will present a systematic procedure for determining all equilibrium threshold strategies. We first
introduce several quantities that we will need in the sequel.
Definition 5.1 Suppose that
(µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) < 0. (5.11)
We define
nU = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 1) < 0}, (5.12)
nL = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 0) ≤ 0}, (5.13)
n−U = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 1) ≤ 0}, (5.14)
n+L = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 0) < 0}. (5.15)
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Then, we have several properties of nU , nL, n
−
U and n
+
L that we summarize in the following
Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.2 Suppose that (5.11) holds. Then, there are three cases:
Case I: HU (0) < 0.
Then
nU = nL = n
−
U = n
+
L = 0, (5.16)
F (n, θ) < 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1], (5.17)
F (n, 0) − F (n, θ) < 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0, 1]. (5.18)
Case II: HU (0) ≥ 0 and limn→∞HU (n) < 0.
Then
1 ≤ nU <∞, (5.19)
F (n, 1) > 0, 0 ≤ n ≤ nU − 2, (5.20)
F (nU − 1, 1) ≥ 0, (5.21)
F (n, 1) < 0, n ≥ nU . (5.22)
and
0 ≤ nL ≤ nU , (5.23)
F (n, 0) > 0, 0 ≤ n ≤ nL − 1, (5.24)
F (nL, 0) ≤ 0, (5.25)
F (n, 0) < 0, n ≥ nL + 1. (5.26)
Moreover,
n+L =
{
nL, if F (nL, 0) < 0
nL + 1, if F (nL, 0) = 0,
(5.27)
n−U =
{
nU , if F (nU − 1, 1) > 0
nU − 1, if F (nU − 1, 1) = 0. (5.28)
For every n0 ∈ {n+L , . . . , n−U−1}, a unique solution θ(n0) ∈ (0, 1) of the equation F (n0, θ) =
0 exists with respect to θ, i.e.
F (n0, θ(n0)) = 0, n
+
L ≤ n ≤ n−U − 1. (5.29)
Case III: limn→∞H
U(n) ≥ 0.
Then
nU = nL = n
−
U = n
+
L =∞, (5.30)
F (n, θ) > 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1], (5.31)
F (n, 0) − F (n, θ) > 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0, 1]. (5.32)
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Proof. In Case I, the condition HU (0) < 0 in combination with the monotonicity of HU (n)
(due to (5.1)) implies that HU (n) < 0, n ≥ 0. Then, we have that F (n, 1) < 0, n ≥ 0 and
therefore F (n, θ) =
∑
∞
i=n(1 − θ)i−nF (i, 1) < 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1] and F (n, 0) − F (n, θ) =∑
∞
i=n[1− (1− θ)i−n]F (i, 1) < 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0, 1].
In Case II, the conditions HU (0) ≥ 0 and limn→∞HU (n) < 0, in combination with the
condition (5.1) for the monotonicity of HU (n) imply (5.19)-(5.22).
Equation (5.22) implies that F (nU , 0) =
∑
∞
i=nU
F (i, 1) < 0 and we conclude (5.23). Note
also that by the definition of nL we have immediately (5.24)-(5.25). Moreover, we have that
F (n, 0) =
∑
∞
i=n F (i, 1) < 0, for n ≥ nU . For n with nL + 1 ≤ n ≤ nU − 1 we have also
F (n, 0) < 0. Indeed, suppose that there exists an n with nL + 1 ≤ n ≤ nU − 1 such that
F (n, 0) ≥ 0. Then we would have F (n − 1, 0) = F (n − 1, 1) + F (n, 0) > 0 and inductively we
would obtain that F (nL, 0) > 0, a contradiction because of (5.25). Thus F (n, 0) < 0, for all
n ≥ nL + 1 and we obtain (5.26).
Equations (5.27) and (5.28) are immediate from (5.20)-(5.22) and (5.24)-(5.26) respectively.
Consider, now, an n0 ∈ {n+L , . . . , n−U − 1}. Then we have that F (n0,1)G(n0,1) > 0 (since n0 ≤ n
−
U − 1
- see (5.20)) and F (n0,0)
G(n0,0)
< 0 (since n0 ≥ n+L - see (5.26)-(5.27)). By condition (5.4), we have
that F (n0,θ)
G(n0,θ)
is a strictly increasing and continuous function of θ, so by Bolzano’s theorem we
conclude that there exists a unique solution θ(n0) ∈ (0, 1) of the equation F (n0,θ)G(n0,θ) = 0. Thus, we
obtain (5.29).
In Case III, the condition limn→∞H
U (n) ≥ 0 in combination with the condition (5.1)
for the monotonicity of HU (n) implies that HU (n) > 0, n ≥ 0 which gives F (n, 1) > 0,
n ≥ 0 and F (n, θ) = ∑∞i=n(1 − θ)i−nF (i, 1) > 0, for n ≥ 0 and θ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover,
F (n, 0) − F (n, θ) = ∑∞i=n[1 − (1 − θ)i−n]F (i, 1) > 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, we conclude
(5.30)-(5.32). 
Using Lemma 5.2 we will now prove the existence of threshold equilibrium strategies, when
(5.11) holds. We present the results in the following Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.1 In the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in alternating
environment, where (5.11) holds, equilibrium threshold strategies always exist. In particular, in
the three cases of Lemma 5.2 we have:
Case I: HU (0) < 0.
Then, there is a unique equilibrium threshold strategy, the ⌈0⌉-strategy (always to balk).
Case II: HU (0) ≥ 0 and limn→∞HU (n) < 0.
Then, an equilibrium pure threshold strategy always exists. Moreover, the equilibrium
strategies within the class of all pure threshold strategies are the strategies ⌈n0⌉ with n0 =
nL, nL + 1, . . . , nU . Also, the equilibrium strategies within the class of genuinely mixed
threshold strategies are the strategies ⌈n0, θ(n0)⌉ with n0 ∈ {n+L , . . . , n−U − 1} and θ(n0) the
unique solution in (0, 1) of F (n0, θ) = 0 with respect to θ.
Case III: limn→∞H
U(n) ≥ 0.
Then, there is a unique equilibrium threshold strategy, the ⌈∞⌉-strategy (always to join).
Proof. Case I: Consider a tagged customer at his arrival instant and assume that all other
customers follow an ⌈n0⌉ strategy for some n0 ≥ 0. Inequality (5.17) and relations (4.60) and
(4.61) imply that the expected net benefit of the tagged customer, when he finds n customers
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and decides to join is Sao(n; ⌈n0⌉) < 0, for 0 ≤ n ≤ n0. Thus, he always prefers to balk and his
best response against ⌈n0⌉ is ⌈0⌉.
We now assume that all other customers follow an ⌈n0, θ0⌉ strategy, for some n0 ≥ 0 and
θ0 ∈ (0, 1). Then, if the tagged customer finds n customers at his arrival instant and decides to
join, his expected net benefit will be Sao(n; ⌈n0, θ0⌉) < 0 for 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 + 1, from (5.17)-(5.18)
and (4.57)-(4.59). Therefore, the tagged customer is always unwilling to join and we have that
his best response against ⌈n0, θ0⌉ is ⌈0⌉.
If all customers follow the ⌈∞⌉ strategy, (5.17) and (4.56) yield Sao(n; ⌈∞⌉) < 0 for n ≥ 0.
Again, due to the negative expected net benefit, it is preferable for the tagged customer to balk.
So, his best response against ⌈∞⌉ is ⌈0⌉. Thus, we conclude that the only best response against
itself within the class of (pure and mixed) threshold strategies is ⌈0⌉.
Case II: Consider a tagged arriving customer and suppose that all other customers follow
an ⌈n0⌉ strategy, for some n0 ≤ nL − 1. If the tagged customer finds n0 customers and decides
to join, his expected net benefit will be Sao(n0; ⌈n0⌉) > 0, from (5.24) and (4.61). This implies
that when he finds n0 customers, he is willing to join. Thus, ⌈n0⌉ cannot be a best response
against itself. So such a strategy cannot be an equilibrium.
Consider, now, a tagged arriving customer and suppose that all other customers follow an
⌈n0⌉ strategy, for some n0 ≥ nU + 1. Using (4.60) and (5.22), we have that Sao(n; ⌈n0⌉) < 0,
for nU ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1. This means that when the tagged customer finds n customers, with nU ≤
n ≤ n0− 1, then he is unwilling to enter. Thus, the ⌈n0⌉ strategy cannot be an equilibrium. We
conclude that the search for equilibrium strategies within the class of pure threshold strategies
should be restricted to strategies ⌈n0⌉ with nL ≤ n0 ≤ nU .
We mark an arriving customer and we assume that all other customers follow an ⌈n0⌉ strat-
egy, for some n0 with nL ≤ n0 ≤ nU . From (4.60), (4.61), (5.20), (5.21), (5.25) and (5.26),
we have that the expected net benefit of a customer who finds n customers upon arrival and
decides to join is Sao(n; ⌈n0⌉) ≥ 0, for 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1 and Sao(n0; ⌈n0⌉) ≤ 0. Thus ⌈n0⌉ is a
best response against itself and we conclude that all such strategies are equilibrium strategies.
To finish with our search for equilibrium strategies in the class of pure threshold strategies,
we have to examine the ⌈∞⌉ strategy. This cannot be an equilibrium, since (4.56) and (5.22)
imply that Sao(n; ⌈∞⌉) < 0, for n ≥ nU , which means that it is not optimal for the tagged
customer to join when he sees n customers for some n ≥ nU . Therefore, we conclude that the
equilibrium strategies within the class of pure threshold strategies are exactly the strategies ⌈n0⌉
with nL ≤ n0 ≤ nU .
We will now search for equilibrium strategies in the class of genuinely mixed threshold
strategies, i.e. among strategies ⌈n0, θ0⌉ with θ0 ∈ (0, 1). A mixed threshold strategy ⌈n0, θ0⌉ is
an equilibrium if and only if the relations F (n, 1) ≥ 0, for 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1, F (n0, θ0) = 0 and
F (n0, 0)−F (n0, θ0) ≤ 0 hold (see (4.57)-(4.59)). A moment of reflection shows that ⌈n0, θ0⌉ may
be an equilibrium only if ⌈n0⌉ is an equilibrium (see (4.57)-(4.59) in comparison with (4.60)-
(4.61)). Thus, we should restrict our search for equilibrium genuinely mixed threshold strategies
to strategies ⌈n0, θ0⌉ with n0 = nL, nL + 1, . . . , nU .
If F (nL, 0) = 0, then there does not exist θ ∈ (0, 1) such that F (nL, θ) = 0, since F (n,θ)G(n,θ)
is strictly decreasing. Therefore, ⌈nL, θ⌉ cannot be an equilibrium strategy for any θ ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, if F (nU −1, 1) = 0, then the strategy ⌈nU −1, θ⌉ cannot be an equilibrium strategy for
any θ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, ⌈nU , θ⌉ cannot be equilibrium for any θ ∈ (0, 1), since F (nU , θ) < 0,
θ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, a strategy ⌈n0, θ0⌉ with θ ∈ (0, 1) may be an equilibrium only if n+L ≤
n0 ≤ n−U − 1.
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Now, for every n0 ∈ {n+L , . . . , n−U − 1}, the only ⌈n0, θ0⌉ strategy that can be an equilibrium
is the one that corresponds to θ0 = θ(n0), since F (n0, θ(n0)) = 0. Indeed, if all customers
follow the ⌈n0, θ(n0)⌉ strategy, the expected net benefit for a tagged customer, who finds n
other customers and decides to join the system, is Sao(n; ⌈n0, θ(n0)⌉) > 0, for 0 ≤ n ≤ n0 − 1,
Sao(n0; ⌈n0, θ(n0)⌉) = 0 and Sao(n0 + 1; ⌈n0, θ(n0)⌉) < 0, from (5.20), (5.26) and (5.29). Thus,
⌈n0, θ(n0)⌉ is an equilibrium strategy.
Case III: Following the same line of argument as in case I, we now find that when all cus-
tomers follow a pure threshold strategy ⌈n0⌉ or a mixed threshold strategy ⌈n0, θ0⌉ the expected
net benefit function is always positive. Thus, the best response of a customer is always to join
the system. Thus, the only best response against itself in the class of threshold strategies is the
⌈∞⌉ strategy. 
Note that although pure threshold strategies always exist, it is possible that genuinely mixed
threshold strategies do not. This happens if n−U − 1 < n+L .
5.2 Case B: (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) > 0
In Case B, we seek for equilibrium strategies in the class of reverse-threshold strategies. We
will exclude strategies ⌊n0⌋ and ⌊n0, θ0⌋ with n0 ≥ 1. Indeed, all these strategies prescribe to
balk, when a tagged arriving customer sees an empty system. Thus, under such a strategy, the
system remains continuously empty, after the first service completion. Therefore, in steady state,
these strategies are equivalent to the ‘always balk’ strategy ⌊∞⌋. Thus, we seek for equilibrium
strategies only in the set Sr−t = {⌊0⌋, ⌊∞⌋} ∪ {⌊0, θ0⌋ : θ0 ∈ (0, 1)}. We first introduce several
quantities that we will use in the sequel.
Definition 5.2 Suppose that
(µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) > 0. (5.33)
We define
mU = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 1) > 0}, (5.34)
mL = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 0) ≥ 0}, (5.35)
m−U = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 1) ≥ 0}, (5.36)
m+L = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 0) > 0}. (5.37)
Then, we have several properties of mU , mL, m
−
U andm
+
L that we summarize in the following
Lemma 5.3.
Lemma 5.3 Suppose that (5.33) holds. Then, there are three cases:
Case I: HU (0) > 0.
Then
mU = mL = m
−
U = m
+
L = 0, (5.38)
F (n, θ) > 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1]. (5.39)
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Case II: HU (0) ≤ 0 and limn→∞HU (n) > 0.
Then
1 ≤ mU <∞, (5.40)
F (n, 1) < 0, 0 ≤ n ≤ mU − 2, (5.41)
F (mU − 1, 1) ≤ 0, (5.42)
F (n, 1) > 0, n ≥ mU . (5.43)
and
0 ≤ mL ≤ mU , (5.44)
F (n, 0) < 0, 0 ≤ n ≤ mL − 1, (5.45)
F (mL, 0) ≥ 0, (5.46)
F (n, 0) > 0, n ≥ mL + 1. (5.47)
Moreover,
m+L =
{
mL, if F (mL, 0) > 0
mL + 1, if F (mL, 0) = 0,
(5.48)
m−U =
{
mU , if F (mU − 1, 1) < 0
mU − 1, if F (mU − 1, 1) = 0. (5.49)
If m+L = 0 and m
−
U ≥ 1, then there exists a unique θ(0) ∈ (0, 1) such that
F (0, θ(0)) = 0, (5.50)
F (n, θ(0)) > 0, n ≥ 1. (5.51)
Case III: limn→∞H
U(n) ≤ 0.
Then
mU = mL = m
−
U = m
+
L =∞, (5.52)
F (n, θ) < 0, n ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1]. (5.53)
We omit the proof of Lemma 5.3 as it is completely analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.2.
We are now in position to prove the existence and uniqueness of reverse-threshold strategies,
when (5.33) holds. We present the results in the following Theorem 5.2. The statements about
the uniqueness of the reverse-threshold equilibrium strategies should be interpreted within the
class Sr−t = {⌊0⌋, ⌊∞⌋} ∪ {⌊0, θ0⌋ : θ0 ∈ (0, 1)} of reverse-threshold strategies.
Theorem 5.2 In the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in alternating
environment, where (5.33) holds, equilibrium reverse-threshold strategies always exist. In par-
ticular, in the three cases of Lemma 5.3 we have:
Case I: HU (0) > 0.
Then, there is a unique equilibrium reverse-threshold strategy, the ⌊0⌋ strategy (‘always to
join’).
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Case 2. HU(0) ≤ 0 and limn→∞HU (n) > 0.
If m−U = 0, the ⌊0⌋ strategy (‘always to join’) is the unique equilibrium reverse-threshold
strategy. If m+L ≥ 1, then the ⌊∞⌋ strategy (‘always to balk’) is the unique equilib-
rium reverse-threshold strategy. Otherwise, the ⌊0, θ(0)⌋ strategy is the unique equilibrium
reverse-threshold strategy.
Case III: limn→∞H
U(n) ≤ 0.
Then, there is a unique equilibrium reverse-threshold strategy, the ⌊∞⌋ strategy (‘always
to balk’).
Proof. Case I: Consider a tagged customer at his arrival instant and assume that all other
customers follow the ⌊0⌋ strategy. Inequality (5.39) and relation (4.56) imply that his expected
net benefit, when he finds n customers and decides to join is Sao(n; ⌊0⌋) > 0, for n ≥ 0. Thus,
he always prefers to join so his best response against ⌊0⌋ is ⌊0⌋ itself.
Similarly, let mark an arriving customer and suppose that all other customers follow a ⌊0, θ0⌋
strategy, for some θ0 ∈ (0, 1). Then, the expected net benefit of the tagged customer, who finds
n customers at his arrival instant and decides to join, will be Sao(n; ⌊0, θ0⌋) > 0, for n ≥ 0 due
to (5.39) and (4.63). Therefore, the tagged customer is always willing to join and we have that
⌊0⌋ is the best response against ⌊0, θ0⌋.
If all customers follow the ⌊∞⌋ strategy, equations (5.39) and (4.62) imply that Sao(0; ⌊∞⌋) >
0, so the tagged customer prefers to join. Thus, we have again that ⌊0⌋ is the best response
against ⌊∞⌋. So the only reverse-threshold strategy which is best response against itself is the
⌊0⌋ strategy.
Case II: Assume that m−U = 0. Then F (0, 1) = 0 and mU = 1. Consider now a tagged
customer at his arrival instant and suppose that all other customers follow the ⌊0⌋ strategy. In-
equality (5.43) and relation (4.56) imply that his expected net benefit, when he finds n customers
and decides to join is Sao(n; ⌊0⌋) ≥ 0, for n ≥ 0. Thus, ⌊0⌋ is a best response to itself.
Assume, now, that m+L ≥ 1, which means that F (0, 0) ≤ 0. If we consider a tagged arriving
customer and suppose that all other customers follow the ⌊∞⌋ strategy, then the tagged cus-
tomer, if he finds 0 customers and decides to join, has expected net benefit Sao(0; ⌊∞⌋) ≤ 0, due
to (4.62). Thus the strategy ⌊∞⌋ is best response against itself, i.e. it is equilibrium strategy.
Otherwise, we will have m+L = 0. Consider again a tagged customer and suppose that the other
customers follow the ⌊0, θ(0)⌋ strategy. Then, if the tagged customer finds n customers at his
arrival instant and decides to join, his expected net benefit will be either Sao(0; ⌊0, θ(0)⌋) = 0 if
n = 0, or Sao(n; ⌊0, θ(0)⌋) > 0, if n ≥ 1, due to (5.50)-(5.51) and (4.63). Therefore, the ⌊0, θ(0)⌋
strategy is equilibrium strategy.
Case III: Following the same line of argument as in case I, we now conclude that the expected
net benefit function is negative. Thus, the best response to every reverse-threshold strategy is
⌊∞⌋. Thus the only equilibrium reverse-threshold strategy is ⌊∞⌋. 
5.3 Case C: (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) = 0
Case C occurs when µ1 = µ2 or
λ1
µ1
= λ2
µ2
. In this case, the distinction ‘fast environmental state’
and ‘slow environmental state’ has no sense or the distinction ‘more congested environmental
state’ and ‘less congested environmental state’ has no sense. Therefore, we conclude that the
information on the number of customers in the system, does not affect the decision of a tagged
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arriving customer. A similar analysis is possible as in the other two cases and we have the
following Theorem 5.3.
Theorem 5.3 In the almost observable model of the stochastic clearing system in alternating
environment, where
µ1 = µ2 or ρ1 = ρ2, (5.54)
an equilibrium strategy exists within the class of threshold and reverse-threshold strategies. In
particular we have the following three cases:
Case I: HU (0) < 0.
Then, the unique equilibrium strategy in the class of threshold and reverse-threshold strate-
gies is the ⌈0⌉ ≡ ⌊∞⌋ strategy (‘always to balk’).
Case II: HU (0) = 0.
Then, every strategy in the class of threshold and reverse-threshold strategies is equilibrium
strategy.
Case III: HU (0) > 0.
Then, the unique equilibrium strategy in the class of threshold and reverse-threshold strate-
gies is the ⌈∞⌉ ≡ ⌊0⌋ strategy (‘always to join’).
6 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we considered the problem of analyzing customer strategic behavior, in a clearing
system in alternating environment, where customers decide whether to join the system or balk
upon arrival. We identified four cases with respect to the level of information provided to arriv-
ing customers and derived the equilibrium strategies for each case. It is important to notice that
in each case we identified all equilibrium strategies within the appropriate class of strategies.
Moreover, in the almost observable case, which is the most interesting one, Theorems 5.1, 5.2
and 5.3 suggest that the equilibrium strategies in the class of threshold and reverse-threshold
strategies are completely characterized by the signs of the quantities (µ1−µ2) (ρ1 − ρ2), HU(n),
limn→∞H
U (n) and HL(n). Thus, we can easily combine these theorems and develop an algo-
rithm for determining the equilibrium strategies. We present the algorithm in pseudo-code form
in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows schematically the various cases I,II,III when (µ1−µ2) (ρ1 − ρ2) < 0.
We have also to notice that the results in the almost observable case are qualitatively dif-
ferent for the two cases A and B, where (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) is negative and positive respectively.
Indeed, in case A, there is, in general an interval of thresholds that constitute equilibrium
threshold strategies. On the contrary, in case B, there is a unique equilibrium reverse-threshold
strategy. These observations correspond to the regimes of Follow-The-Crowd (FTC) and Avoid-
The-Crowd (ATC) as defined in Hassin and Haviv (1997, 2003). Indeed, in case A, where
(µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) < 0 we have that the ‘fast service’ environmental state coincides with the
‘less congested’ environmental state. Then, we can argue as follows, if we want to compare two
threshold strategies with thresholds n and n + 1: If the customers follow a threshold strategy
with threshold n and an arriving customer observes n customers in the system, then he de-
duces that at least n customers arrived since the last clearing epoch. If the customers follow a
threshold strategy with threshold n+1 and the arriving customer observes n customers, then he
deduces that exactly n customers arrived since the last clearing epoch. Thus, in the latter case,
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the arriving customer has the sense that the system is less congested and therefore the environ-
mental state is most probably the ‘fast service’ one. We conclude that the arriving customer is
more willing to enter the system. Therefore, if the customers adopt a higher threshold, an arriv-
ing customer tends to follow them in adopting a higher threshold and we have an FTC situation.
On the other hand, in case B, where (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) > 0, we have that the ‘low service’
environmental state coincides with the ‘less congested’ environmental state. The usual defini-
tion of the ATC situation is not applicable here, since we consider reverse-threshold instead of
threshold strategies. Moreover, under any reverse-threshold strategy ⌊n, θ⌋ with n ≥ 1, the sys-
tem remains continuously empty after the first visit of the transportation facility and so we have
excluded these strategies in our seek for equilibrium strategies. Thus, in case B, we will limit
our intuitive discussion of the ATC phenomenon to the class of strategies {⌊0, θ⌋ : θ ∈ [0, 1]},
as we have already done in the analysis of subsection 5.2. Suppose that the customers follow
a reverse-threshold strategy ⌊n, θ⌋ and then they move to another reverse-threshold strategy
⌊n, θ′⌋ with θ′ > θ. Consider now an arriving customer that finds 0 customers in the system.
Knowing the strategies of the other customers, the arriving customer has the sense that the
system is in the less congested environmental state in the second case, where the customers
enter with probability θ′. Indeed in this case, the customers are more willing to join than in the
first case (since θ′ > θ) so the information of an empty system imply that it is more probable
that the system is in the less congested environmental state. Therefore, the customer becomes
less willing to enter, as the less congested environmental state coincides with the low service
state. Thus, when the other customers increase the probability of entering, the tagged customer
tends to decrease his probability of entering, i.e. we have an ATC situation.
The focus of this work was on equilibrium analysis. On the other hand, one can think
of a situation where a central planner employs acceptance policies that maximize the social
benefit, under the various levels of information on the system state. It is easy to see that in the
fully unobservable, the fully observable and the almost unobservable cases the strategies that
maximize the social benefit are the equilibrium strategies. This coincidence between equilibrium
and socially optimal strategies can be explained by the total removals. Since the server removes
all customers at service completion epochs, each customer who decides to join does not impose
any externalities to other customers. In the almost observable case equilibrium and socially
optimal strategies are identical except from the case whereHU (n) is strictly decreasing, HU (0) ≥
0 and limn→∞H
U (n) < 0. In this case the unique socially optimal strategy is the ⌈nU⌉ strategy,
which is also an equilibrium.
7 Bibliography
1. Artalejo, J.R. and Gomez-Corral, A. (1998) Analysis of a stochastic clearing system with
repeated attempts. Communications in Statistics - Stochastic Models 14, 623-645.
2. Burnetas, A. and Economou, A. (2007) Equilibrium customer strategies in a single server
Markovian queue with setup times. Queueing Systems 56, 213-228.
3. Economou, A. (2003) On the control of a compound immigration process through total
catastrophes. European Journal of Operational Research 147, 522-529.
4. Economou, A. and Fakinos, D. (2003) A continuous-time Markov chain under the influence
of a regulating point process and applications in stochastic models with catastrophes.
24
European Journal of Operational Research 149, 625-640.
5. Economou, A. and Fakinos, D. (2008) Alternative approaches for the transient analysis of
Markov chains with catastrophes. Journal of Statistical Theory and Practice 2, 183-197.
6. Economou, A. and Kanta, S. (2008a) Optimal balking strategies and pricing for the single
server Markovian queue with compartmented waiting space. Queueing Systems 59, 237-
269.
7. Economou, A. and Kanta, S. (2008b) Equilibrium balking strategies in the observable
single-server queue with breakdowns and repairs. Operations Research Letters 36, 696-
699.
8. Edelson, N.M. and Hildebrand, K. (1975) Congestion tolls for Poisson queueing processes.
Econometrica 43, 81-92.
9. Gani, J. and Swift, R.J. (2007) Death and birth-death and immigration processes with
catastrophes. Journal of Statistical Theory and Practice 1, 39-48.
10. Guo, P. and Zipkin, P. (2007) Analysis and comparison of queues with different levels of
delay information. Management Science 53, 962-970.
11. Hassin, R. (2007) Information and uncertainty in a queuing system. Probability in the
Engineering and Informational Sciences 21, 361-380.
12. Hassin, R. and Haviv, M. (1997) Equilibrium threshold strategies: the case of queues with
priorities. Operations Research 45, 966-973.
13. Hassin, R. and Haviv, M. (2003) To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in
Queueing Systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
14. Kim, K. and Seila, A.F. (1993) A generalized cost model for stochastic clearing systems.
Computers and Operations Research 20, 67-82.
15. Kyriakidis, E.G. (1994) Stationary probabilities for a simple immigration-birth-death pro-
cess under the influence of total catastrophes. Statistics and Probability Letters 20, 239-
240.
16. Kyriakidis, E.G. (1999a) Optimal control of a truncated general immigration process
through total catastrophes. Journal of Applied Probability 36, 461-472.
17. Kyriakidis, E.G. (1999b) Characterization of the optimal policy for the control of a simple
immigration process through total catastrophes. Operations Research Letters 24, 245-248.
18. Kyriakidis, E.G. and Dimitrakos, T.D. (2005) Computation of the optimal policy for the
control of a compound immigration process through total catastrophes. Methodology and
Computing in Applied Probability 7, 97-118.
19. Naor, P. (1969) The regulation of queue size by levying tolls. Econometrica 37, 15-24.
20. Serfozo, R. and Stidham, S. (1978) Semi-stationary clearing processes. Stochastic Processes
and their Applications 6, 165-178.
21. Stidham, S.Jr. (1974) Stochastic clearing systems. Stochastic Processes and their Appli-
cations 2, 85-113.
25
22. Stidham, S.Jr. (1977) Cost models for stochastic clearing systems. Operations Research
25, 100-127.
23. Stidham, S.Jr. (2009) Optimal Design of Queueing Systems. CRC Press, Taylor and
Francis Group, Boca Raton.
24. Stirzaker, D. (2006) Processes with catastrophes. Mathematical Scientist 31, 107-118.
25. Stirzaker, D. (2007) Processes with random regulation. Probability in the Engineering and
Informational Sciences 21, 1-17.
26. Sun, W., Guo, P. and Tian, N. (2010) Equilibrium threshold strategies in observable
queueing systems with setup/closedown times. Central European Journal of Operations
Research 18, 241-268.
27. Yang, W.S., Kim, J.D. and Chae, K.C. (2002) Analysis of M/G/1 stochastic clearing
systems. Stochastic Analysis and Applications 20, 1083-1100.
28. Zhang, F. and Wang, J. (2010) Equilibrium analysis of the observable queue with balking
and delayed repairs. 3rd International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and
Optimization, CSO 2010: Theoretical Development and Engineering Practice 2, art. no.
5533079, 125-129.
26
ALGORITHM
if (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) < 0 then
if HU (0) < 0 then “Equilibrium threshold strategies: ⌈0⌉.”
elseif limn→∞H
U (n) ≥ 0 then “Equilibrium threshold strategies: ⌈∞⌉.”
else
% Compute nU : nU = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 1) < 0}
nU = 0
while F (nU , 1) ≥ 0 do
nU = nU + 1
endwhile
% Compute nL : nL = inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 0) ≤ 0}
nL = nU
while F (nL − 1, 0) ≤ 0 do
nL = nL − 1
endwhile
% Compute n−
U
: n−
U
= inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 1) ≤ 0}
if F (nU − 1, 1) > 0 then
n−
U
= nU
else
n−
U
= nU − 1
endif
% Compute n+
L
: n+
L
= inf{n ≥ 0 : F (n, 0) < 0}
if F (nL, 0) < 0 then
n+
L
= nL
else
n+
L
= nL + 1
endif
“Equilibrium threshold strategies: ⌈n0⌉, n0 = nL, nL + 1, ..., nU .”
if n+
L
≤ n−
U
− 1 then
for n0 = n
+
L
: n−
U
− 1
Compute θ(n0) : F (n0, θ(n0)) = 0
endfor
“Equilibrium mixed threshold strategies: ⌈n0, θ(n0)⌉, n0 ∈ {n
+
L
, ..., n−
U
− 1}.”
endif
endif
elseif (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) > 0 then
if HU (0) > 0 then “Equilibrium reverse-threshold strategies: ⌊0⌋.”
elseif limn→∞H
U (n) ≤ 0 then “Equilibrium reverse-threshold strategies: ⌊∞⌋.”
else
if F (0, 1) = 0 then “Equilibrium reverse-threshold strategies: ⌊0⌋.”
elseif F (0, 0) ≤ 0 then “Equilibrium reverse-threshold strategies: ⌊∞⌋.”
else
Compute θ(0) : F (0, θ(0)) = 0
“Equilibrium reverse-threshold strategies: ⌊0, θ(0)⌋.”
endif
endif
else
if HU (0) > 0 then “Equilibrium threshold strategies: ⌈0⌉.”
elseif HU (0) < 0 then “Equilibrium threshold strategies: ⌈∞⌉.”
else “Equilibrium threshold strategies:⌈n⌉, n ≥ 0.”
endif
endif
Figure 1: Computation of equilibrium threshold/reverse-threshold strategies
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Case II
Multiple equilibria:
⌈nL⌉, ⌈nL + 1⌉, · · · , ⌈nU⌉
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Figure 2: Case A - (µ1 − µ2)(ρ1 − ρ2) < 0 - Equilibrium threshold strategies
✲
✻
n
⋄
⋄
⋄ ⋄ ⋄ ⋄
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ : HL(n)
⋄ : HU (n)
Case III
Unique equilibrium:
join (⌈∞⌉)
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